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Established in 1958, the current hukou system (household registrationsystem) encompasses a series of regulations that institutionally divideall Chinese citizens into two categories: “agricultural hukou” (nongye
hukou) holder and “non-agricultural hukou” (fei nongye hukou) holder. Serv-
ing to distribute resources between rural and urban areas, control rural-to-
urban migration, and monitor certain groups of people, the hukou system
has since its very beginning imposed a huge gap between rural and urban
China. The citizens from the two categories are entitled to distinctively dif-
ferent social welfare benefits, including access to subsidised housing, edu-
cation, medical care, old-age pensions, and employment opportunities, in
absolute favour of “non-agricultural hukou” holders. (1) The rural-urban cleav-
age caused by this system and other imbalanced inputs from the govern-
ment is so great that Whyte calls the situation literally “one country, two
societies.” (2) That, to a great extent, has resulted in the fact that in the past
six decades or so, converting one’s rural hukou to an urban status has be-
come a central aspect of upward social mobility in rural China. (3)
However, hukou status is ascribed at birth and is mainly passed on by
one’s parent(s). Children normally inherited the mother’s hukou status, and
it is only in recent years that children have been allowed to choose either
their mother or father’s hukou status, the policies varying from region to
region. (4) Identity as an “agricultural hukou” holder or a “non-agricultural
hukou” holder is to some extent solidified into inheritable social identities.
This has made it extremely difficult for an agricultural hukou holder to ob-
tain an urban hukou. Throughout the past several decades, rural people have
had some channels through which they could obtain an urban hukou. The
main identifiable routes mainly include higher education, cadre functions,
and military service. (5) Apart from these direct paths guaranteeing the
change of one’s status from rural to urban, there have been indirect chan-
nels, which while not bringing an immediate change of status could result
in partial access to urban resources, closing the rural-urban gap in the form
of improved well-being. (6) Rural-to-urban labour migration and rural-to-
urban marriage are among these channels. The implications of these direct
or indirect routes have nevertheless fluctuated according to changing po-
litical and socio-economic circumstances and policies, and are gendered.
For example, the aforementioned routes of cadre functions and military
service are more open to men, whereas more women have been seen using
marriage as a social mobility channel. Two main periods could be identified
according to the changing circumstances: the collective era (1950s–1978)
and the reform era (1978 onwards). (7)
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This article attempts to capture, in relation to the two aforementioned
historical periods, the ups and downs of these various forms of upward social
mobility channels and how these fluctuating routes have been perceived,
interpreted, pursued, and actualised by the rural people in a central Chinese
village, and considers their consequences in terms of gendered household
educational resource distribution among children. By doing this, it addresses
ongoing debates about the relationship between allocation of household
resources, gender inequality, and social mobility in rural China. While ex-
amining the dynamics of these avenues to social mobility, it pays particular
attention to education and its changing function as an important social
mobility channel, and argues that there is an unintended link between
higher educational attainment, improvements in gender equality in educa-
tion in rural China, and social mobility. This link is nevertheless weak due to
its logic of developmentalism, which assumes girls’ education would be use-
ful only when it could bring forward development. This logic sees girls as
agents of development of their family and the state, without caring much
about how their own lives would be affected.
This article first reviews the gendered functions of education, marriage,
and labour as means of social mobility for rural Chinese from a theoretical
perspective. After briefly introducing the setting of the village of Lianhe and
the research methods, it then proceeds to examine the upward social mo-
bility means and their gendered consequences in the collective era and re-
form era respectively. It then moves on to discuss the recent declining
function of higher education as a social mobility means and its implications
for gender equality in rural Chinese households. The conclusion sketches
out both empirical and theoretical findings.
Social mobility and gender in rural China:
Education, labour, and marriage as routes
Social mobility routes for contemporary rural Chinese women have been
documented in works on gender inequality in rural China, even though possible
avenues are not systematically discussed. For example, in a paper on the rise
of “girl power” in rural Chinese households, Yan Yunxiang(8) suggests that since
the 1950s, rural Chinese girls have been gradually altering their position in the
domestic sphere from being “outsiders” to new players in family affairs via ex-
ternal powering actors such as collective farming, participation in public ac-
tivities, and better chances for social mobility through marriage, apart from
state policies and reforms in favour of women. He identifies women’s labour
and marrying up as a potential social mobility means in the collective era.
Zhang Hong, (9) based on her research on an inland village in Hubei, found that
like their collective-era sisters in the village studied by Yan Yunxiang, rural girls
in contemporary Zhongshan Village have been empowered by the cash-earning
power gained from rural-to-urban labour migration, (10) despite the fact that
lower fertility resulting from the family planning policy has also contributed
to their empowerment. Juxtaposing these two works, one cannot help thinking
about the implications of marriage as a social mobility avenue in reform-era
rural Chinese society. Furthermore, while absolutely agreeing on the point re-
garding the downsized family, I would like to suggest that Zhang fails to dif-
ferentiate the rural youth who literally “escape from the countryside” via higher
education from those who engage in labour migration. “Higher education” and
“labour migration” are two totally different social mobility paths, both on the
institutional level and in the rural population’s perception.
Institutionally, the actual residence of someone with an agricultural hukou
in the city does not guarantee the obtainment of an urban status. This has
caused the situation in which rural-to-urban labour migrants are not enti-
tled to many labour rights and benefits enjoyed by their urban counterparts
who have an urban hukou, no matter how similar their jobs are. Educational
barriers for migrants’ children and health insurance barriers for migrants
also exist. In this sense, although labour migration might be able to improve
the rural people’s well-being in the form of increased income, it cannot
change their status. An agricultural hukou can, however, be changed to an
urban one upon admission to a specialised secondary school (zhongzhuan)
or college/university, and the new non-agricultural hukou holders have ac-
cess to the aforementioned welfare. (11) This has resulted in disparate per-
ceptions of rural Chinese about these two routes.
To “jump out of the agricultural gate” (tiaochu nongmen) is the term
used in southwestern and central rural China to refer to the situation in
which one not only stops farming and leaves the countryside but also
attains “real work” (zhenzheng de gongzuo). (12) According to some sur-
veys conducted among the rural-to-urban migrants, “real work” is asso-
ciated with an identity as an urban resident and access to welfare limited
to this group. The wage jobs done by the rural-to-urban migrants who
are still registered as farmers are “dagong” (employment) at most, not
“work” (gongzuo), according to the migrants themselves. (13) In other
words, these rural Chinese perceive a hierarchy between “labour”
(laodong), “employment” (dagong), and “work” (gongzuo), with “work”
on the top. This also has caused the general impression in the countryside
that “higher education” and “labour migration” are two totally different
social mobility paths.
One consequence of this hierarchal perception is the often-mentioned
rural parents’ absolute preference for academic education over vocational
secondary education (zhongdeng zhiye jiaoyu). Their preference is due to
the former topping the hierarchy of schooling in China and leading to a “real
job” with urban hukou and welfare attached, while the latter can only im-
prove one’s “labour” situation. Despite the promotion of vocational educa-
tion by the state, parents consider it for their children only if other
higher-status educational opportunities are blocked or unattainable. (14)
Another consequence is the pervasive common understanding in post-re-
form era rural China that education is the only way for rural youth to
“tiaochu nongmen.” As a mother from rural Shandong told Paine and De-
Lany, “Only through education can rural kids make their way (chulu).” (15)
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Paine and DeLany, (16) Weng, (17) and Kipnis (18) advocate understanding the
meaning of schooling constructed by the rural population. After examining
their understandings, they suggest that education in rural China is “margin-
alising,” as the significance of practical, rural knowledge is marginalised in
rural schooling; and the conception of knowledge is what is promoted by
authorities who are often located in urban centres, and is urban-oriented.
How have the “marginalising” effects of academic education affected rural
girls? Heidi Ross found that in rural Shaanxi, “most parents and girls, who
see around them a tightly constricted job market, remain convinced that
the only way for a girl to have a better life is by following the academic
path.” (19) But she expresses concern for “the logic of developmentalism” (20)
inherent in rural parents’ educational aspirations for their daughters and the
state’s endeavours to improve gender equality in education. This logic of
developmentalism assumes educated girls “to be both recipients and agents
of development, not its victims.” (21)
From a historical perspective, this research intends to contribute to this
strand of understanding education, gender equality, and social mobility in
rural China. It broadens the time frame to include the collective era, and
covers mobility avenues other than education, mainly labour and marriage,
as these are also sites of gender construction that influence a female’s abil-
ity to receive and use formal education. As a result, it reveals the gendered
implications of the hierarchal perception of various social mobility means,
and the gendered consequences of the logic of developmentalism in edu-
cation.
The setting and methods
This paper mainly draws upon quantitative data and ethnographic infor-
mation that the author collected in a central Chinese village, Lianhe, (22) from
September 2005 to May 2006. A later series of interviews via telephone and
further visits in 2008 and 2012 also provided useful information. Situated
in Sha County, central Hubei Province, Lianhe had approximately 450 house-
holds and 1,600 residents in 2005. Villagers mainly rely on farming or jobs
in faraway cities, or a mixture of farming and skilled manual or seasonal ca-
sual jobs in the county seat. Industrialisation is still at a low level, which
makes Sha County mainly an exporter in terms of rural-to-urban labour mi-
gration. According to the local government’s statistics, in 2005 about 54
percent of those aged between 18 and 35 left Sha County to work in big
cities.
The method used in this study is a combination of participant observation,
qualitative interviews, and some quantitative demographic data collected
from the villagers. I had lived in Lianhe until the age of 18, and had connec-
tions in the village. During the ethnography I lived for eight months with a
rural family that acted as intermediaries to introduce me to more intervie-
wees. As a result, a snowball sampling method was adopted. The project
was designed to explore the life stories of three generations of villagers in
terms of their changing labour, leisure, and marriage/family lives.
In the end, a total of 57 women from various age backgrounds told me
stories about their lives; 21 men were interviewed on their education and
family/marriage lives. They all were agricultural hukou holders, and were
particularly encouraged to talk about education attainment for themselves
and their child(ren). Attention was particularly paid to the moments when
residents decided to stop pursuing further education. I also managed to talk
to three recent university graduates (two women and one man) who were
originally from Lianhe and came back to visit their family from where they
were working. My participant observation and informal chats in the villages
provided another source of information.
Based on information collected via formal and informal interviews, my
observation, and some data provided by the village committee, I managed
to document the details of those who managed to obtain an urban hukou
in Lianhe between 1950 and 2012, collected in Table 1, above. These details,
together with life stories told by the villagers, enable us to depict the trans-
forming social mobility channels and their gender consequences within rural
households in Lianhe in both the collective era and the reform era.
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Table 1 – Details of those who managed to obtain an urban hukou in Lianhe between 1950 and 2012
* This woman didn’t attain an urban hukou upon marrying an urban hukou holder, but did so upon succeeding her father-in-law’s position in a local post office, since her handicapped husband was not
qualified for this position.
Social mobility and gendered household
distribution of resources among children in
the collective era
This section focuses on social mobility channels in the collective era, their
impacts on the gendered distribution of household resources for children
in rural households, and the attendant family dynamics.
Social mobility means in the collective era
In the commune system of the collective era, a peasant could achieve so-
cial mobility mainly in one of the following three ways: firstly, higher edu-
cation: A rural youngster would be granted urban hukou status upon
admission to a specialised secondary school (zhongzhuan) or university
(daxue). (23) Secondly, cadre functions: The career path of first becoming a
cadre and attaining membership in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at
the production team or production brigade (i.e. village) level and then being
promoted to a cadre at or above the commune (i.e. township) level allowed
one to become part of the state’s administrative personnel system and re-
sulted in the granting of urban status. In the collective era, becoming a cadre
was enticing in itself, even without promotion to the township level, as lead-
ers of production teams and production brigades normally had absolute au-
thority in the organisation of labour and distribution of resources. (24) And
finally, military service: The career path of joining the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA), thereby attaining membership in the CCP, and then getting pro-
moted in the army, or being discharged from military service into a local
cadre, was a way into the state’s administrative personnel system and trig-
gered urban status. (25) Although hukou conversion through higher education
was not restricted by government quota, the investment was huge and it
took a long time to achieve. Furthermore, besides the expense of 12 years
of pre-college education, there was the risk that rural students would fail in
the college entrance examinations. This would result in them returning to
their village and remaining peasants from then on. Higher education was
therefore a risky investment. Moreover, the National College Entrance Ex-
amination was suspended from 1966 to 1977. University enrolment stopped
until some institutions began to recruit so-called worker-, peasant-, and sol-
dier- (gongnongbing) students on a political and labour performance basis
in 1972. (26) However, with recommendation rather than merit opening the
way, and with a rather limited quota, most of the opportunities went to
those who had power or powerful connections. (27) Hence in the collective
era, the most realistic way for most peasants to enter the city was by be-
coming a cadre or joining the People’s Liberation Army.
These opportunities were far more limited for women than for men. Few
women joined the army; even fewer local cadre positions were available for
women, except for the person in charge of women’s issues, who was always
a woman. Even the women who did become cadres rarely had a real say in
the committee; at most they simply carried out state policies and orders from
above and normally were subordinate to male leaders (28) so that most pro-
motion opportunities, if any, went to the latter. Consequently, virtually all ex-
isting means for obtaining an urban status were blocked for rural women. The
only possible routes through which rural young women could achieve upward
social mobility in their households and/or in society in general were labour
and marrying-up, even though these means did not guarantee the change of
their rural hukou. This greatly shaped the household educational resources
distribution configuration in Lianhe during the collective era.
Family dynamics: Paving the way for the boys
Stories in which daughters, especially older daughters, were asked back
from school to help with childcare and/or labour in the collective were told
to me again and again by parents and then-school-aged children. Subsis-
tence-level living conditions and family size also played a role in these stories.
Following the improved reproductive health of rural women, collective-era
rural China had seen a post-revolutionary “baby boom” (29) that further re-
duced the average resources to which each child had access. But it was al-
ways girls who were asked to leave school; I did not find a single case in
which a boy was forced to leave school. Most were allowed to stay in school
as long as they wished unless they themselves did not want to continue,
usually due to poor scholastic achievement. Among the 57 women, 20 were
of school age during the collective era; 13 of those 20 were the older sibling
in their family, with an average of two years in school, while seven were
younger daughters and could on average stay at school for six years. Among
the seven men who attended school during this period, no matter what their
birth order, they stayed at school for eight years on average.
Apart from education, Lianhe parents cultivated social networks in order
to put their boys on track for a cadre career or army recruitment. The story
of Hanying, a young mother in the collective era, provides a good example.
When I met her in 2005, she was really proud of her earlier investment in
her oldest son. He had become deputy party secretary, that is, the second
most powerful person in Lianhe at that time, or according to Hanying, a
“superior person” (ren shang ren 人上人). This family did not have powerful
connections, but according to Hanying, her oldest son’s “eminence” was due
on one hand to his capabilities and on the other to her cultivation of con-
nections for him, especially at the outset of his career. She mentioned that
when the whole family was on the verge of starvation, she saved good food
to treat those who could possibly be useful to her son’s promotion, with
the hope that her son would achieve upward social mobility. In the end, her
son did not manage to attain an urban hukou, but still managed to hold a
powerful position in the village. Stories like this are not rare in collective-
era Lianhe, but not all parents could succeed in the end, despite their en-
deavours. As shown in Table 1, three men from Lianhe managed to attain
an urban hukou via cadre function or army service during the collective era.
They are all currently living in the urban areas of the county seat or the
prefecture, doing non-farming jobs or retired. The villagers in Lianhe showed
enormous envy when they mentioned the three men’s “light and easy” work
in an office or their retirement pensions.
In contrast to this, chances for a girl to “get out of the countryside” were
so slim that it would be much more realistic for her to improve her family
life via labour and/or marrying up. Stories of girls being forced to leave
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school to help parents with childcare and collective labour were often told
to me. Marrying an urban hukou holder, as mentioned above, enabled rural
women to gain access to the limited benefits granted to their urban hus-
bands, (30) despite the fact that their rural status could not be changed upon
rural-to-urban marriage. (31) This became so enticing that villagers reported
cases in which healthy rural young women married young men who were
disabled or widowed or divorced but who had an urban hukou. Indeed, as
shown in Table 1, the only woman in Lianhe who managed to change her
status in the collective era achieved that through marrying a handicapped
urban man, and fortuitously obtained an urban hukou by succeeding her
father-in-law’s working position in a local post office, as her disabled hus-
band was not able to do it. Lianhe villagers’ comments on this case were
mixed. A woman of similar age even used the word “degrade” to refer to
the healthy-disabled match when she told the story to me, but in the end,
she showed obvious envy toward that woman’s current easy life while she
herself had to toil in the field for only a little income.
It was not easy, however, to secure a marriage with an urban hukou holder.
In many cases, a rural girl married someone who was from the same area
and had the potential to attain an urban identity through cadre functions
or military service at some point after getting married. Actually, the wives
of the three Lianhe men who obtained an urban hukou through these means
had been living a much better life than their rural sisters in Lianhe, even
though they did not manage to change to an urban status. According to
Lianhe women, they have a good fate (haoming).
According to the villagers, however, this kind of marriage was available to
only a very small proportion of girls with family networks through which
the marriage was arranged. For most purposes, in the collective era, Lianhe’s
young girls were encouraged to marry a rural young man through a match
that would reinforce both families. Cases reported by the villagers revealed
that from the 1950s to the early 1980s, village endogamy was a striking
phenomenon in which typically more than half of the villagers were en-
gaged. (32) Apart from a small proportion who claimed their marriage was
the result of mutual admiration in the collective, the majority of women
reported that their village endogamy was actively arranged by family mem-
bers, especially mother and/or grandmother, and was somewhat against
their will. For example, Lianmei, the oldest daughter of Hanying, the woman
mentioned above, reported that her mother, in contrast to facilitating her
son’s promotion, asked Lianmei to give up school after less than a year so
she could mind the younger children; and afterwards, she made Lianmei
marry a boy from her own natal family, with the aim of “strengthening the
ties,” largely against Lianmei’s will. (33) In the collective era, when local cadres,
especially males, had absolute authority, a daughter’s marriage within the
village could become a diplomatic strategy for a family to strengthen itself,
as it would bring in new power for the family to resist hostility from leaders
or other powerful influences in the village. Again, family networks played
an important role in the arrangements. While possibly strengthening power
in the collective, village endogamy did not significantly change or benefit
women’s lives compared to obtaining a rural-to-urban marriage.
Social mobility and gendered household
distribution of resources among children in
the reform era
The scenario in the reform era was different. The means for social mobility
changed, and the demographic context of rural households was different
due to economic reform and the implementation of the family planning
policy from the 1970s onward. These resulted in different family dynamics
and rural parents’ different patterns in terms of distributing household re-
sources among their children.
“Leather shoes or straw sandals?”: Education as an
avenue of upward social mobility
In the reform era, it has become much harder, if not impossible, to change
one’s status from rural to urban through cadre functions or military serv-
ice. (34) On the other hand, higher education has become a much smoother
avenue, and both rural parents and scholars declare it “the only” means. (35)
In response to this, rural parents started to place enormous aspirations on
their children’s education. Firecrackers are lit in the village for those who
manage to “du chu qu” (get out of the countryside via schooling), and ban-
quets are arranged to celebrate young people’s success in achieving an
urban identity before they leave for their new life in the city. (36) Many ac-
tually take remedial courses after failing the National College Entrance Ex-
amination on the first attempt, and retake the examination several times if
needed.
The link between education and social mobility has gained unprecedented
emphasis among rural parents and teachers in the reform era. A former pri-
mary school teacher in Lianhe told me that she uses the contrast between
“leather shoes” and “straw sandals” to encourage her students to study hard.
She said:
You have to study hard! If you work hard and gain admission to a
university, you will be able to wear leather shoes all the time. But if
you don’t, you will only have straw sandals.
The metaphor of “leather shoes” versus “straw sandals” reflects rural peo-
ple’s understanding of the huge gap between urban and rural China. Lectures
given by teachers have been echoed by rural parents. I asked each parent
with young children in the reform era about their aspirations for their chil-
dren’s future. None of them wanted their children to stay in the countryside.
Farming is absolutely at the bottom of their list and is the least desired
prospect for their children. All rural parents I interviewed agreed that “jump-
ing out of the rural gate” (tiaochu nongmen) through higher education and
then obtaining a formal job in the city is at the top of their priorities.
The perception and meaning of schooling constructed by rural Chinese is
in fact at the root of some recent educational developments. For example,
as mentioned above, parents showed absolute preference for academic ed-
ucation over vocational education. Another example is the sudden nation-
wide decline in enrolment rates for specialised secondary schools
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(zhongzhuan) in the late 1990s after a long period of flourishing, despite
the government’s promotion, and the concurrent boom in senior secondary
schools (gaozhong) nationwide. Specialised secondary schools had gained
popularity among rural parents over college education during the 1980s
and most of the 1990s. Compared to college, which enrolled only senior
secondary school graduates, specialised secondary schools recruited excel-
lent junior secondary school (chuzhong) graduates and demanded a rela-
tively shorter term of investment while offering enticing returns, that is, an
urban identity and a “state” job secured by the government. Their attraction
of a large proportion of junior secondary school graduates constituted a
major reason for the low net enrolment rates for senior secondary schooling
before the 2000s. Toward the end of 1990s, however, the job allocation sys-
tem was abrogated, resulting in a specialised secondary school graduate
having to fend for herself/himself. Concurrently, the expansion of the higher
education sector in 1999 greatly lowered the threshold for college and
caused an unusually high rate of college enrolment between 1999 and
2003. (37)A specialised secondary school qualification can in no sense com-
pete with a college qualification. This pushed a large proportion of junior
secondary school graduates onto a senior secondary school-then-college
path and caused the dramatic decline in specialised secondary schools in
the late 1990s. As a result, the net enrolment rate for senior secondary
school almost doubled between 2000 and 2008 after experiencing a long
“bottleneck” period. (38)
This transformation can actually be tracked in Lianhe. As shown in Table
1, before 1999, five young people went to specialised secondary school,
compared with only two who were enrolled in universities; while in the post-
1999 era, six went to specialised secondary schools without attaining the
academic performance required for a place in a good senior secondary
school (gaozhong) or university (daxue), according to the villagers, in con-
trast to 22 who were academically capable of choosing the route of senior
secondary school and then university. The decisions made by rural students
and their parent in Lianhe actually were congruent with the national trend.
The complexity of gender equality in education,
labour migration, and marriage
How has this transformation in education’s function as a social mobility
means affected Lianhe parents’ resource distribution among their children?
First of all, apart from this change, socio-economic and demographic con-
text in the reform era has also changed. Since its implementation in the
early 1970s, the family planning policy has caused a downsizing of families
in rural China. (39) Lianhe is no exception. In rural China, due to popular re-
sistance, the “one-child policy” was recast such that if the first-born child
was a girl, a peasant couple could have another child after an interval of
four years, while if the first-born was a boy, the couple was not allowed ad-
ditional births. This amended version has been popularised as a prevalent
population control policy in rural China since about 1988. (40) Lianhe resi-
dents generally observed this amended version of the policy, with only a
very few exceptions caused by fluctuations in implementation and, in a mi-
nority of cases, infringement of the policy. On the other hand, despite im-
provement in living standards brought about by economic reform in its early
stage, the cost of supporting a child’s education until he or she enters uni-
versity is much higher than in the collective era. (41) In Lianhe, parents
lamented that children’s educational expenses had eaten up a large propor-
tion of their income. Under these circumstances, their decisions on “invest-
ing how much in which child(ren)” are circumspect. Do they still give pref-
erence to sons?
The biggest difference between higher education and other aforemen-
tioned social mobility means, particularly cadre function and military serv-
ice, is that it is based on merit and academic achievement as well as
household resources, rather than gender. Therefore, it opens a way for rural
women as well as for men. This, together with the aforementioned socio-
economic and demographic context of rural households, changes rural par-
ents’ strategies to invest in their children’s education. A bias toward
academically stronger children, whether boys or girls, can be widely ob-
served among rural parents in Lianhe, a fact that effectively increases the
level of gender equality in education.
As shown in Table 1, in Lianhe in the reform era, 35 young people have
made their wish to “tiaochu nongmen” come true, among whom 12 are
boys and 23 are girls. Among these girls, four are from daughter-only fam-
ilies, while the remainder (19) have an older or younger brother. (42) Among
the 19 girls, two have a brother who is also a specialised secondary
school/college graduate; five have a brother who left school after finishing
nine-year-compulsory education; and the rest have a younger brother who
is still pursuing his education in either junior or senior secondary school
(chuzhong or gaozhong). Apart from these families, I also came across sev-
eral rural parents who told me they will invest more in their daughter’s ed-
ucation, with the hope that she will be admitted to a university, as they felt
she could achieve higher marks at school than their son(s). Among the 35
young peoples’ families, the majority were facing constrained resources. De-
spite this, many parents reported that they borrowed money from local
banks or relatives to keep their academically promising children, either boys
or girls, in school. My interviews with two academically stronger girls re-
vealed that their brothers actually discontinued schooling after the nine-
year basic education so that the limited family resources could be
concentrated on the more academically promising girls. The brother of one
of the girls even engaged in labour migration to Guangdong, aiming to earn
tuition fees for her.
A strong incentive behind the investment in academically stronger children
is the high returns it can bring about: first of these is an urban hukou and
the welfare attached to it; secondly, a “formal job” in the city could incur
more income than either farming or migrant labour; and finally, it means
permanent residence in a city, while labour migration is often temporary, es-
pecially for women. (43) These returns on investment in academically strong
children are witnessed by other villagers, who are encouraged to follow the
example. In one case in Lianhe, the family of two sisters suffered serious eco-
nomic deficiency while they both were at university, but now, according to
their mother, the monthly pay of each is equal to the annual income of a
typical peasant household. Such cases no doubt encourage parental aspira-
tions for daughters’ education, especially in households without a son.
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Parents in Lianhe, especially mothers, generally report that between their
son and their daughter, they wish even more for their daughter to “jump out
of the agricultural gate.” “Life in the countryside is too hard for a girl!” they
lament. Actually, in the stories told by Lianhe parents and girls, those girls
who obtained an urban hukou through higher education are now living in “a
different world” from other girls who did not manage to do so. I met a 24-
year-old Lianhe girl, Da’e, in 2005. She left school at the age of 16 due to
poor performance, and had been engaging in migrant labour in Fujian and
Guangdong since then. She came back to Lianhe due to the closure of the
hair salon where she had been working in Guangzhou. She told me the fol-
lowing when mentioning Ling, a former neighbour and schoolmate in Lianhe
who chose an academic path, obtained an urban hukou in Guangzhou, and
found a bank job there after graduating from university: “We were both living
in Guangzhou, but we belonged to two different worlds. We grew up together,
but now I am one of those ‘floating workers’ while she is a ‘white collar’ girl
in Guangzhou. We will have absolutely different life paths: hers, relatively
easy and secure; mine, full of hardship and uncertainty…” In Lianhe, boys
who do not achieve academically can learn manual skills such as heavy ma-
chinery operation, painting, driving, welding, or mechanical repair through
technical school or apprenticeship. These skills often guarantee a decent in-
come in the rural areas, but they are considered unsuitable for rural girls. (44)
Girls without academic achievements either help parents with farming or
do non-farming factory jobs in the county seat or other urban areas. After
getting married, they toil between home and farmland/factory. Like parents
in rural Shaanxi, most Lianhe parents and girls “who see around them a
tightly constricted job market, remain convinced that the only way for a girl
to have a better life is by following the academic path.” (45)
This, to a great extent, has improved gender equality in education in
rural households, as stated in Attané’s article in the present issue. Large-
scale quantitative surveys reveal that the largest differential in access to
education in China since reform is not a gender gap, but an urban-rural
one. (46) As shown in Graph 1, compared to the situation in 1990, in 2000,
the gender gaps for rural children’s access to both basic nine-year com-
pulsory education and post-basic education – that is, the university
preparatory period that often occurs between 16 and 18 years old – are
closing. In 2000, even though rural boys were generally still getting better
education than rural girls in that age group, the improvements in gender
equality in education in rural China are obvious, especially in the case of
rural youth aged 16 to 18, normally the year for entering university. And
in 2010, the nationwide school retention ratios for rural girls were very
close to those of rural boys before the age of 13. More importantly, for
the first time in history, for every age group between 13 and 18, greater
proportions of rural girls than boys remained in school. That means that
gender equality in education in rural China has greatly improved, whether
during the compulsory education period or the university preparatory pe-
riod.
The improvement in rural girls’ education is, however, subject to the logic
of developmentalism, which assumes that educated girls will boost the de-
velopment of their family and the state, without considering the possible
effects “educational desire” might have on them. (47) In fact, studies in rural
China suggest that showing early academic promise may be particularly
important for rural girls. (48) That means rural girls have to study extremely
hard, and they normally only gain priority over their brother(s) when their
academic achievements are significantly better and when they demonstrate
the absolute promise of success. That would also put them under consider-
able pressure. Furthermore, since the improvement of gender equality is not
an end in itself, it could be reversed when circumstances change. More de-
tails regarding this will be given in the next section. What has occurred in
Lianhe is exactly what has been taking place in rural Shaanxi, where Heidi
Ross did her research: “The most important factor, after taking into account
the girls’ performance in school, was whether further schooling would be
relevant, attainable and deliver a stable, preferably state, job.” (49) In this
sense, the closing gender gap in education in rural China is to some extent
an “unintended consequence” of the complex structural transition in China.
Furthermore, as also shown in Graph 1, in both 1990 and 2000, less than
one fifth of rural youth could pursue an academic route till they were 18
years old. In 2000, over half of both boys and girls chose to leave school at
16, the age of completing compulsory education. Despite the great im-
provement of education attainment in 2010, less than half of rural youth
chose to remain in school till 18. Lianhe was no exception in this regard.
Lianhe parents told me that if their children do not have the potential or
luck to achieve anything academically, employment (dagong) as a rural-to-
urban migrant is the second option. Labour migration has become an im-
portant way to improve rural families’ lives, as the average wage of
rural-urban migrants is more than three times that of the average farmer. (50)
But who does what kind of migrant labour is more complicated than we
might have expected. The configurations of resource distribution between
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Graph 1 – School retention ratio of Chinese adoles-
cents between 10 and 18 in 1990, 2000, and 2010,














Source: Based on data of population censuses of 1990, 2000, and 2010. The data of 1990 and 2000
refer to Zheng Zhenzhen, Rachel Connelly, “Cong liangci renkou pucha jieguo kan Zhongguo de
jiaoyu fazhan” (Observations of the Development of China’s Education from the Results of Popula-
tion Censuses), Renkou yu jingji (Population and Economics), 2008, no. 4, pp. 44-50.
out-of-school children depend to a great extent on the gender structure of
children and the economic situation of the household. In households with
both son(s) and daughter(s) where none shows academic promise at school,
their parents may, if the economic situation permits, pay the high price of
buying admission to a technical secondary school for them. If resources are
short, such opportunities are normally restricted to boys, since sons are seen
as the ones who financially support their own family after marriage, while
daughters will contribute to their husband’s family by providing unpaid do-
mestic work and care. As a result, out-of-school boys often start learning
manual skills while girls work on assembly lines or in the service sector.
However, in households with only daughters, girls can enjoy a relatively
higher level of equality in resource distribution.
In the county where Lianhe is situated, about 54 percent of those aged
between 18 and 35 left their hometown to work in big cities in 2005.
Among them about 70 percent were women, possibly due to their “nimble
fingers” being more popular in South China’s export factories. (51) The local
government did not document their educational background, but judging
from their age, the great majority of these young women left school after
completing nine-year-compulsory education.
Compared to education and labour migration, marriage seems a less im-
portant avenue of social mobility in reform-era Lianhe. Firstly, since de-col-
lectivisation, village politics have been less intensive, and village endogamy
seems to have lost its popularity. Secondly, marrying an urban hukou holder
from a nearby county town or prefecture seems not only unfeasible due to
the large scale of labour migration, but also not that enticing due to the in-
land-coastal regional differences they have witnessed. In theory, labour mi-
gration can facilitate the marriage of girls from inland rural areas to boys
from more affluent coastal areas and therefore cause a bride shortage in
inland areas, as Davin has warned. (52) This might be true before 1990 when
the 1990 census revealed that marriage was the leading reason for women’s
migration. (53) However, the 2000 Chinese census showed that more than
two-thirds of migrant women between the ages of 15 and 44 cited em-
ployment not marriage as the principal reason for their migration. (54) In
Lianhe and the surrounding villages, in 2005 and 2006, I did not observe a
single case in which a rural girl migrated to a wealthier area due to marriage.
That might be because these girls’ contacts with local men are limited due
to the fact that their social networks are normally confined to “people from
the same hometown” or colleagues from work (55) on the one hand, while
the widely-adopted dormitory labour system has made the factory their
main working and living space on the other. (56-57)
Is education still a social mobility ladder?
When education as a social mobility ladder is not as effective as before,
what will happen in terms of rural parents’ educational investment? Re-
search shows that along with the expansion of higher education in China
since the late 1990s and the increasing enrolment rates of college students,
the returns on higher education have decreased. Firstly, the difficulty for
new university graduates to secure a job has become one of the greatest
emerging worries in China in the last few years. (58) Intensifying competition
in the labour market and the impact of guanxi (referring to a person’s net-
work of relationships) have also added to the woes of the socially disad-
vantaged, particularly college graduates with a rural origin. (59) Importantly,
research reveals that in recent years, the enrolment rate of students with a
rural origin in China’s first-tier universities has continued to decline, and the
majority of college students from rural areas mostly congregate in second-
tier or even third-tier universities. (60) This makes it more difficult for them
to compete with those from a better university.
Secondly, even when they find a job, skyrocketing housing prices and living
costs in Chinese cities make it difficult for them to repay what their parents
have invested in their education. Those with a rural origin who obtain an
urban identity upon attaining higher education are often categorised as
“phoenix men” (fenghuang nan) and “phoenix women” (fenghuang nu). (61)
Compared to their urban counterparts, who often receive financial assistance
from their parents in housing purchases, (62) they not only receive no help,
but must actually send money back to support their parents. Compared to
“phoenix women,” “phoenix men” face even greater challenges, as husbands
are traditionally expected to prepare housing for future married life. (63) If they
are unable to do that, their marriage prospects in the city will be affected.
Parents in Lianhe acutely sense this change. An anxious mother asked me,
“When can my son get married and have his own house?” Her son is a col-
lege graduate and is now working in Shenzhen. With a monthly income of
about 7,000 yuan, very decent from Lianhe villagers’ point of view, he cannot
afford to buy a flat in Shenzhen, contributing to his being dumped by his
girlfriend. At the same time, another young man from Lianhe, one of his junior
secondary school classmates, saved up 100,000 yuan by working on con-
struction sites in Shenzhen for years. With this money, he built a two-storey
house for himself in Lianhe and married a girl from Henan whom he met in
Shenzhen. This comparison increased the aforementioned mother’s worry.
These situations have discouraged rural people’s investment in their chil-
dren’s education, and the idea that “education is useless” is emerging and
prevailing in some parts of rural China, especially poor areas. (64) When house-
hold resources are constrained, rural parents will not borrow money to send
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their academically promising children to school as some did before 2000,
since the returns have decreased. In relatively better-off families, however,
when economic circumstances permit, parents are still willing to invest in
girls’ higher education, as life in the city seems easier for a “phoenix woman”
than for a “phoenix man” who must buy housing for future married life.(65)
In the end, girls’ academic performance and the economic situation of the
family play key roles.
Conclusion and discussion
Since 1958, the hukou system and the constantly imbalanced inputs from
the government in favour of urban areas have made obtaining an urban
identity a key aspect of upward social mobility in China. Throughout the
last six decades or so, higher education, cadre functions, and military service
have become relevant or irrelevant for rural boys and girls to obtain urban
status, in accordance with changing political and socio-economic circum-
stances and policies. Marriage and labour have also functioned as social
mobility avenues. Through adopting a biographical approach, this research
examines how rural parents in Lianhe have responded to the fluctuating im-
plications of these social mobility means and the gendered consequences
among their children. Despite seemingly individual choice, the decisions
rural Chinese parents make regarding resource distribution among their chil-
dren is bound and affected by elements at the family level (marriage and
population policies), the economic level (employment and labour market
situations), and the cultural level (values and preferences regarding appro-
priate roles and aspirations for sons and daughters by fathers and mothers).
This research suggests that apart from being the result of the Chinese gov-
ernment’s efforts, the closing gender gap in education beyond the nine-year
basic education in rural China is also an “unintended consequence” of the
rural Chinese population’s attempts to break through rural-urban segrega-
tion and achieve social mobility. Education as a social ladder is also open
to girls. The key factors are the academic promise showed by girls and the
economic situation of the family.
The correlation between social mobility means and improved gender
equality in rural China nevertheless sadly reveals that in this logic, educated
girls become valued by their parents as a means for reducing poverty and
improving the family’s situation. The lives of rural girls are rarely considered
ends in themselves. This is demonstrated by the fact that in the collective
era, rural girls were forced to leave school to help with childcare and col-
lective labour or to accept marriage against their will, while in the reform
era, girls with poor academic performance leave school to engage in migrant
labour. On the issue of rural girls’ education, rural parents’ logic is congruent
with “the logic of developmentalism” (66) of the Chinese state. To some ex-
tent, the concern for girls’ education in developmentalistic logic has resulted
in improved gender equality in education. But Ross worries that when girls’
lives are rarely considered as ends in themselves, the improvement will be
impaired. (67) Rural parents’ logic seems to reproduce the logic of the state
at the household level. In other words, the improvement in gender equality
in education could be easily reversed.
Furthermore, recent research reveals that the rural-urban gap in higher
education has been replaced by more subtle inequality in which rural chil-
dren congregate in second-tier and even third-tier universities, and educa-
tion’s function as a social mobility ladder is declining. The fact that the
rural-urban gap is actually still widening and becoming even more difficult
to bridge has already negatively impacted rural Chinese population’s “edu-
cational desire.” How will this affect gender equality in education in rural
China? This will be a question requiring more scholarly attention. 
Moreover, the biographical approach enables us to observe family dynam-
ics over time. Over these 60-odd years, we have seen in the collective era
that extra-household institutions favoured older rural men who were more
likely to attain an urban hukou through being promoted to certain official
positions or in the army, while in the reform era, the institutions are more
favourable to young people, as they have opportunities to obtain urban
hukou through higher education or to enhance their livelihoods through the
labour markets in south/east China, which especially favour young girls with
nimble fingers, clearer vision, and more energy.
Finally, while the conclusion is drawn based on research in a central Chi-
nese village, a similar phenomenon, including mobility routes for rural girls,
aspirations for academically promising girls, and perception of the hierarchal
relationship between academic education, vocational education, rural-to-
urban labour migration, and marriage can also been seen in rural Shaanxi,(68)
rural Shangdong,(69) rural Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou,(70) and rural
Gansu. (71) Poverty and its huge rural-urban gap are what these areas have
in common. In this sense, what we have found in Lianhe may represent the
situation in poor rural Chinese areas generally.
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